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What Are Institutional Reforms? 
Before answering the question "What are institutional reforms?" it is necessary to define the concept of insti-
tutions. Institutions involve a set of rules and regulations that define the space in which actors who attempt to
achieve particular objectives operate. Institutions exist wherever people realize the need to organize their
actions in accordance with the rules set in advance. Thus, the institution of parliament sets the rules under
which laws are adopted. The institution of elections sets limits for parties that are competing for power. The
institution of private property sets limits under which individuals make profit on the market, etc. Apart from
setting limits, institutions serve to divide the functional operations of state, market, and society. Actors seeking
to achieve a particular goal or objective choose the appropriate institutions within which to act. The one who
wants to pass a law, goes to the parliament; the one who wants to compete for power, participates in elec-
tions; the one who wants to engage in production and trade, goes to the market, etc. 
The major feature of Institutions is that they are impersonal. Furthermore, they interact with one another,
thus producing particular outcomes. The outcomes of parliamentary institutions are laws. The outcomes of the
electoral institutions are electoral winners (a ruling party or a ruling coalition). The outcome of the market insti-
tutions is the allocation of resources, etc. Impersonality of institutions is the main characteristic that distin-
guishes democratic from authoritarian system. The problem with the Miloäevi regime was not the lack of insti-
tutions, but the fact they were not observed. Take elections as an example. The institution of elections encom-
passes several sub-institutions such as election law, electoral committees, party system, electorate, media sys-
tem, election campaign of political participants and their programmes, etc. All these sub-institutions work in
interaction and if they are rationally organized (in that they do not contradict each other), they invariably pro-
duce particular outcomes. A system with stable institutions continues to exist after such an outcome has been
produced since the actors in such a system accept the outcome whatever it may be. Authoritarian regimes,
however, are not compatible with such an impersonal outcome. If he does not like the outcome, the authori-
tarian ruler interferes and cancels it. This was the case with the institution of elections, as well as with many
FRY 2000 2000 IX 2001 IX 2001 IX 2001 I-IX 2001
Basic Economic Indicators 1999 VIII 2001 IX 2000 I-IX 2000
GDP growth, in real 1994 pricesa É 8.4% É É É É
Industrial Production É 10.9% É 5.5% -4.9% -3.5%
Montenegro É 3.7% É 2.4% -2.2% -0.6%
Serbia É 11.4% É 5.7% -5.1% -3.7%
Central Serbia É 12.0% É 4.3% -11.7% -7.9%
Vojvodina É 10.1% É 8.2% 9.1% 6.0%
Average nominal net wage - Serbia in Din.1 2,389 89.5% 6,210 1.9% 141.1% 138.1%
Real net wage - Serbia1 É 5.5% ... 0.1% 22.2% 9.1%
Average net wage - Serbia, in DEM1 93 -11.2% 203 1.8% 140.1% 143.1%
Average net wage - Serbia, in DEM2 ... ... 226 1.3% ... ...
Average gross wage - Serbia, in DEM2 ... ... 326 1.3% ... ...
Unemployment Rate - registered3 28.38% É 29.9% 0.6% 3.9% 4.4%
Montenegro ... É 39.2% 0.3% É É
Serbia 27.45% É 29.2% 0.7% 4.9% 4.9%
Current account, in USD millions -1,298 3.2% É É É É
Trade balance, in USD millions -1,989 -10.6% -153 9.3% 12.5% 17.1%
Export - USD million 1,713 15.0% 159 22.3% 2.1% 3.5%
Montenegro 157 31.1% 2 -77.8% -83.2% -1.6%
Serbia 1,411 13.8% 157 14.7% 9.9% 4.2%
Import - USD million 3,662 12.6% 312 15.6% 5.9% 21.1%
Montenegro 313 -1.0% 16 -40.7% -8.9% 35.8%
Serbia 3,035 15.6% 293 21.7% 6.7% 18.9%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, in DIN billion 29.6 60.7% 52,623.0 8.39% 121.52% 103.44%
Cash 10.3 39.8% 17,640.6 9.45% 94.88% 89.56%
Deposits 19.3 74.9% 34,982.4 7.86% 137.93% 111.76%
Real money supply, end of period, in DM million 1,043 -26.7% 1,723.64 8.21% 139.39% 82.90%
Hard currency reserves, in million USD (end of period) 524 76.2% 1,048.30 10.3% É É
Discount rate É É 1.30% -18.75% -35.00% -24.00%
Market interest rate, monthly level 5.84% 37.3% 4.32% -12.90% -33.74% -8.79%
Retail prices — Serbia É 70.0% É 1.4% 104.5% 116.3%
Consumer prices — Serbia É 79.6% É 1.8% 97.3% 118.3%
Producer prices — Serbia É 102.6% É 1.5% 88.2% 111.1%
Average exchange rate —  Din./DEM 25.45 103.2% 30.53 0.2% -0.8% 26.7%
a) Figures refer to FRY without Kosovo
1 Comparable to the average net wage calculated according to the method applied until June 1, 2001. 
2 By the gross wage calculation methodology applied as of June 1, 2001.
3 Figures refer to August 2001.
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other institutions under Miloäevi. Whenever Miloäevi did not like the outcome arrived at through the inter-
action of compatible institutions, he tried to alter or annul it.
It is now clear what institutional reform is all about. Reforms in Serbia should be aimed, above all, at orga-
nizing the institutions that would, rather than actors, affect the outcome of the political process. A political sys-
tem in which the participants have the power to ex ante or ex post revoke the outcome brought about by the
interaction of institutions is not a stable one. The difference between authoritarian and totalitarian systems, as
well as various kinds of dictatorship, and democracy is that the institutions in an authoritarian regime are so
weak that the actors are able to alter the outcome of institutions whenever they want.
The reform of economic institutions requires that the outcome of economic the activity of an actor stem
from the logic of institutions, not from the intervention of actors. Economic reforms can be divided into two
parts. On the one hand, they require drawing a firm distinction between the state and the economy. On the
other hand, economic reform means the establishment of particular market institutions that specify property
rights and facilitate trade and exchange. The first aspect of reforms includes liberalization of market entry, lib-
eralization of prices, reduction of budget expenditures, liberalization of business banks, liberalization of wages,
and, as the most important aspect, privatization. However, the withdrawal of the state from the economy is just
one part of the economic reforms since in communist economies many economic and market-oriented mech-
anisms had not existed at all. Therefore, the second aspect of economic reforms is about establishing a legal
framework for new market-oriented institutions. This includes legislation on trade companies, monopoly, labor
markets, foreign investment, international trade arbitrage, laws that establish and regulate financial market, etc.
In short, economic reforms are about establishing a framework for production, trading and making profit,
where the market as an impartial "umpire" is to have the decisive role in the allocation of resources.
Both these aspects are necessary to define institutional reforms in the economic sense. This is easy to com-
prehend if we keep in mind the fact that most of these laws existed both in socialism and the Miloäevi regime.
That a great many number of these laws were not fully market-oriented was not the only problem. The state
had significant influence on the economy in two senses: first, it constantly did, and in particular occasions it
had to, arbiter between different participants in the economy; second, the institutions were not impersonal but
highly subject to individual interference. Liberalization of the economy requires a reduction of the number of
decisions that could be, even theoretically, influenced by the state. This part of institutional reforms has been
more or less successfully carried out in most countries undergoing the process of transition. For example, the
fact that the prices are no longer controlled or that free purchase of foreign exchange is allowed means that
the state is no longer a sovereign economic participant that decides who sets the prices, or who controls for-
eign exchange under favorable rate of exchange. In many countries of Central and Eastern Europe institution-
al reforms slowed or even stalled at this point. The second, much harder aspect of reform is to create the base
for a system where the application of economic law is not under the influence of powerful individuals and
political circles.  This step is on the way of realization in only a few transition countries. These changes are
much more complicated. Firstly, the realization of these changes is harder to control by either domestic or for-
eign subjects (the existence of a law is not questionable, but the way this law is put into effect is subject to
various interpretations and very often not transparent). Secondly, it requires that circles with the power to guar-
antee certain outcomes submit themselves to impersonal institutionalized rules and uncertain outcomes.
Therefore, the implementation of the second aspect of institutional reforms will be very hard to accomplish in
the Serbian society as well. Only a one-year experience with transition in Serbia confirms that. While pro-
gressing well in the first aspect of institutional reforms, we have not gone far with the second one.
From everything that has been advanced so far, it follows clearly that the main difference between author-
itarian and democratic systems is that in the latter the possibility for the actors to interfere with political process
by avoiding institutions is reduced to a minimum. However, there have been some authoritarian regimes based
on the predictability of institutions. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that there must not be just any insti-
tutional reform, but the reforms that establish a democratic polity. The most general understanding of democ-
racy, which distinguishes it from kinds of authoritarian and totalitarian systems, suggests that in democracy
there are decisions directly or indirectly made by all people. The most suitable definition of democracy, suit-
able for the understanding of institutional reforms in Serbia, is the one formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in
his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. In SchumpeterÕs view, democracy is a method by which the
citizens are entitled to select who is to make political decisions. The role of the citizens is only to elect a gov-
ernment choosing among different political parties. Everything else is to be solved at the level of political elites.
Democracy is not the rule of the people but rather a rule of politicians, though a kind of a rule where the peo-
ple can protect themselves from the abuse of power by replacing politicians in the next cycle of elections.
Democracy is a system where ruling parties lose elections, while the result of democratic elections is unpre-
dictable. The participants who are competing for power attempt to win elections, but since each step depends
on what other side does, the result of the elections cannot be predicted. The outcome of democratic process
in uncertain, but it does not mean that nothing can be predicted. Democracy is neither chaos, nor anarchy.
Uncertainty means that the actors know what might happen, but not what will happen exactly. Democracy is
uncertain only in latter meaning of the word. The actors know what might happen since the possible outcomes
are brought about by institutional framework they act within. They know what is most probably to happen
since the probability of each single outcome is determined by the institutional framework and by the resources
engaged by different political parties during elections. Yet, the precise outcome that will come about remains
unknown. 
Institutional reforms are not to be understood as a completed act, but rather as an ongoing process. The
reforms might be initially successful, but endlessly slow, as in Romania and Bulgaria, or they may even fail, as
in Russia. A democratic system is established when the basic institutions are consolidated. Consolidation means
that the main political and economic actors willingly accept the rules established by the institutions. They
accept the outcome of economic and political processes even if it is not to their advantage. In the system of
stable institutions, there might be disagreements and disputes over distribution of resources, but basic institu-
tional rules could not be a subject of these disputes themselves. In Central and Eastern Europe, institutional
reforms started after the failure of Communism. However, the reforms have not been successful everywhere
simply because, soon after establishing them, the actors began to change, revise or, as Miloäevi did, ignore
them. Institutional reforms mean the establishment of institutions that by their nature constrain the actions of
the participants. This is not easy to accomplish since an external authority could not establish the institutions,
but only by the participants whose actions these institutions are to constrain. The establishment of institutions
and their reform are full of temptation. However, the success of institutional reforms is precisely about over-
coming this temptation. The actors must commit themselves to establishing basic political and economic insti-
tutions that would not be changed, modified, revoked, or ignored for the sake of short-term political goals.
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Constitutional Reform in FR Yugoslavia
The Type of Federal State
Constitutional reform of the federation began in January 2001, when President
Koätunica offered "A Basis For a Joint Platform on the Constitutional Reorganization
of FRY" (hereinafter: the Platform) to the Montenegrin Government for consideration.
Apart from this Platform, there are two other proposals circulating in the public at the
moment: the first, drawn up by the Belgrade Center of Human Rights in August 2000,
contains both a federal and confederate solution; the second is worked out by the
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies in Belgrade (hereinafter: the Proposal). Since
the Platform is a shorter version of this Proposal, and the Belgrade Center for Human
Rights federal solution is more or less a copied version of it, we are largely going to
analyze the Proposal.
The new idea in the Proposal is an attempt to define the context within which a
new constitution can be adopted. The 1992 Constitution of FRY was adopted in the
period of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, when it was necessary to political-
ly strengthen the two political elites in power. The Constitution was an instrument
that was meant to justify MiloäeviÕs alleged effort for the survival of Yugoslavia. In
the Proposal, there is a new context where Yugoslavia is seen as a functional union
based on the principles of efficiency and equality. Efficiency refers to the decision-
making in federal bodies; equality aims at preventing the outvoting of Montenegro as
a smaller federal unit. As it will be shown later, the context so defined has a decisive
effect on almost every institutional solution that can be found in the Proposal. The
context itself is well defined, but the offered solutions are not.
The proposal fails to take into account aspects that are critical for refurbishing the
distorted ties between Serbia and Montenegro. The definition of context neglects the
existing situation in which Serbia and Montenegro are practically two sovereign
states. Under such circumstances, the federal state could be erected only with a kind
of state contract where Serbia and Montenegro would agree to hand over a part of
their prerogatives to the federal state. The proposal simply assumes a national ener-
gy and willingness of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to have a joint state. At
this moment, however, such will and energy is at best an alleged fact.
The Proposal avoids repeating articles of the existing federal Constitution that
define Yugoslavia as a sovereign state, but rather attributes sovereignty to the citizens
of Serbia and Montenegro. This solution fully corresponds to the principle of sub-
sidiarity by which public policies are formulated and executed at the lowest practical
level. By the principle of subsidiarity, lower levels are sovereign and transfer their
prerogatives to higher levels only if they are not able to pursue their policies them-
selves. The principle of subsidiarity is usually preceded by the view that there are a
number of functions that could not be realized within federal units, but only within
the federal state. These could include, for example, a joint defense and currency. The
proposal defines subsidiarity as a principle "that allows federal state to use only those
functions that will be better and more efficiently realized at the level of the union
rather then at the level of federal units." This solution is in agreement with the defi-
nition of subsidiarity, since subsidiarity does not allow a clause permitting the union
to assign prerogatives to itself, but it is not in agreement with the concept of original
prerogatives that the union, according to the Proposal, should have.
That is, the Proposal cannot come to terms with who is really sovereign in the
union. It explicitly rules out the possibility for the federal government to have any
original powers, claiming that "it can be attributed new power only if this is agreed
by the federal units". The assumption is, as can be seen, in favor of federal units. But
the reading of the word "original" in the Proposal leads to the conclusion that the fed-
eral state sets the volume of its affairs independently. That the Proposal confuses
"original" and "transferred" prerogatives is clear from the proposition that "the feder-
al government is allowed to pass its prerogatives to the republics or their adminis-
trative bodies." It sounds absurd that the union can transfer back to the republics
something the republics had previously transferred to the federal state. A consistent
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity mandates that the union cannot pos-
sibly have original, but only transferred powers. To avoid confusion, it is necessary
to separate the term "original power" from the term "policy that the union pursued
autonomously". Even if it is possible to have some fields where federal bodies
autonomously pursue policies, these prerogatives can by no means be original but
only transferred. Such solution is absolutely compatible with what was stated in the
ProposalÑnamely, that the union of Serbia and Montenegro "will be in charge of only
those affairs without which the union system will not be able to function efficiently."
The fundamental idea of federalism is exhausted in the equal representation of fed-
eral units in the federal bodies. What policy these bodies are going to pursue after
being established is another question.
Labus makes his
assessment
Four proposals on
the constitutional 
reorganization of
FRY
Subsidiarity:
sovereignty to the 
citizens of Serbia and
Montenegro rather
then to the state
The Structure of the Government
The Proposal basically preserves the existing structure of government, introducing
slight changes. It foresees a bicameral parliament, president of the state, and a gov-
ernment organized by the chancellor model. Although the Proposal was published in
June 2000 and is not familiar with Amendment V, which replaced Article 97 of the 1992
Constitution and introduced direct elections for the President of FRY, it nevertheless
insists on indirect elections for the president. The exclusion of direct election of the
president is justified, as this solution, by and large, had a sweeping effects on further
worsening of relations between Serbia and Montenegro during 2000 as well as on the
change of political system in Serbia after federal elections on September 24, 2000. 
The Proposal offers a new rationale for the function of the president. It says, "the
President of the republic is a person of undisputed public reputation in the whole
country where he acts as politically neutral authority, which is the best recommenda-
tion for presentation of the country abroad. Therefore, there should be a constitutional
recommendation that the President of the Republic abstain from representing any
political party." Such a rationale for the function of the president that insists on his
neutrality surely merits applause.
However, in the current political constellation, the question is if it is possible at all to
find such a neutral person in the Serbia or Montenegro. The president represents the
country, but he usually should represent all the citizens of that country as well. All
Yugoslav presidents so far have acted at least partially, i.e. as representatives of their par-
ties, or, in the best case, as representatives of the Serbian people. This practice is far from
abandoned despite the October changes. Only a few months after October 5, President
Koätunica has been declared in Montenegro and Vojvodina as a successor of the
Miloäevi practice. This has affected KoätunicaÕs popularity, which plummeted from
59.3% in December 2000 to 32.1% in August 2001. More indicative is citizensÕ trust in the
institution of President of the Republic. While in September 1999 it was 23%, after polit-
ical changes it increased to 74% in June 2001, but decreased again to 62% in August. 
The institution of the president in the Serbian and Yugoslav context has damaging
effects on the development and consolidation of democracy. The main reason is that
the President, without having a prerogative for doing so, attempts to pursue his own
policy. This practice leads to so-called "dual executive." Although the President, under
the Constitution, is not the supreme commander of the army, in time he has devel-
oped a special relation with the highest military officers, thus delimiting the armyÕs
civil control. The persistent postponement of reform of the Yugoslav army, the only
institution untouched by the reforms after the October changes, says it all. A model of
dual executive is blurring the answer to the question who is in charge of the FRY mil-
itary forces, since there are at least three institutions that deal with the Army: the
President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. Yugoslavia has a federal
structure and therefore the number of subjects is increasing. The control of military
forces in Yugoslavia today is less constitutional, and more dependent on informal
agreements between the Yugoslav President, who is in charge of the army, and the
Serbian Prime Minister who is in charge of the Serbian police forces.
Apart from suggesting the abandonment of direct elections of the president, the
Platform does not really touch other prerogatives of the President. Although both the
1992 Constitution and the Proposal foresee the PresidentÕs responsibility in the case of
a violation of the Constitution (and an attempt to pursue his own policy by all means
constitutes a violation of the Constitution), it might be safely assumed that the
President will continue to work in such a manner without suffering any legal or polit-
ical consequences. The authors of the Proposal are aware of this danger and, in order
to diminish the PresidentÕs influence as much as possible, they suggest a new solution
by which "it is required for all acts of the President of the Republic to be previously
countersigned by the federal Prime Minister." If the President is not allowed to make
any decisions that are not previously counter-signed by the Government, is not it then
more rational to dismiss the institution of president completely from the constitution,
and transfer all his prerogatives to the Government?
As already mentioned, the Proposal, supporting the idea of a minimal and func-
tional federation, makes a radical departure from the existing Constitution. The
Proposal drastically reduces prerogatives, confining them to basic rights and liberties,
international relations and foreign policy, national defense and foundations of the
economy system aimed at protection of a united market. In the background of this
solution lies a hope that such a reduced list of prerogatives might make the federal
state more attractive to Montenegro, since Montenegro has already independently
taken on a number of prerogatives that, under the current Constitutional solution, are
supposed to be under the control of the federal state. However, in order to meet the
needs of Montenegro, and to insure equality, it is not only critical to reduce federal
prerogatives, but also to redefine how federal authorities are arranged and how they
make decisions. The Proposal completely fails on this point because it maintains
majority decision-making in the Chamber of Citizens and restores the chancellor sys-
tem of government.
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The Parliament is to consist of two chambers, one elected by a majority system and
the other by proportional system. Decisions, however, would be made on a consen-
sual basis: a law cannot be enacted if both chambers do not vote for it.  The Proposal
revokes Amendment VIII of July 6, 2000 that introduced an indistinct way of election
of the government and restores the chancellor model of government, which is based
on majoritarian decision-making. The solution that better secures equality with respect
to decision-making is a consociational model. The consociational model is opposed
to the majority in that it avoids decision-making system that by definition excludes the
minority. In majoritarian democracy, the majority makes all decisions. In a consocia-
tional democracy, the decisions are, by and large, made by all. Like the majoritarian
model, the consociational one also accepts majority decision-making, but this is only
the minimal condition. Instead of a simple majority, this model tends to demand super
majorities. Besides, the consociational model is focused on division, dispersion and
limitation of power. When it comes to the governmentÕs policy, the most noticeable
conceptual difference is that the majoritarian model is based on exclusion (of the
minority), competition and rivalry, while the consociational approach is based on
inclusion (of the minority), bargaining, and compromise. 
The consociational model is convenient whenever there are at least two separate
entities. It serves to block the possibility of outvoting the minority. In countries such
as the U.S., the United Kingdom or New Zealand, the damaging effect of majority
decision-making over the minority are easily overcome, as todayÕs minority can
become tomorrowÕs majority. This cannot possibly hold in any variant of Yugoslav
federation, since there are no federal parties. If we apply an ideal majoritarian system
at the federal level, it would put Montenegrin parties in the constant minority. Of
course, the 1992 Constitution, as well as the Proposal, are a far cry from mandating
the ideal majoritarian democracy and do have conspicuous traces of the consocia-
tional idea. Yet, an alternative solution, which is defended in this analysis, would seek
to implement consociational principles in full.
The fact that in FR Yugoslavia, even during the most harmonious period between
Serbia and Montenegro, there has never been any federal party to participate in elec-
tions at federal level, is a reason enough to reject the solution of the Proposal and set-
tle on a consociational model instead. According to this approach, there would have
to be parity in the structure of all federal organs. The federal parliament would con-
sist of two chambers: one whose representatives are elected directly, but with an
equal number of representatives from each republic, and the other consisting of del-
egates sent directly by the federal units or elected by the unitÕs parliaments according
to the representation of particular parties in them (a ratio of 20:20 is enough in both
chambers). The federal parliament would make decisions upon consensual principle
in both chambers, but in each chamber a consensual voting would be mandatory.
The same solution is necessary for the federal Government. The consociational
model suggests that the government should consist of an equal number of ministers
from each republic. According to the present solution, advocated also by the Proposal,
there is a chancellor type of government. This solution, taken over from the German
Groundgesetz, means that firstly the Parliament agrees on the choice of Prime Minister
who is then free to choose ministers, not respecting the party basis. If he finds it suit-
able, all the ministers can come from Serbia. The Prime Minister also does not have
to respect the party structure of the Parliament. He may choose ministers from any
party, as well as experts with no party background. This model is in full compliance
with the majoritarian principle of decision-making due to the leading role of the Prime
Minister. The consociational model differs here on two points. Firstly, a government
is formed by the parity principle, meaning an equal number of ministers is guaran-
teed to both republics. Secondly, ministers are delegated by leading coalitions from
both republics, and the Prime Minister is to accept the decision made by the republics.
He has no influence over the selection of ministers. As for decision-making within the
government, the consociational model is based on absolute consensus. 
It is worth pointing out that the Federal Government voted in on July 24, 2001 is
formed on the consociational principle. The two leading coalitions, DOS and
"Together for Yugoslavia" first agreed on the number of ministers and division of
Ministries, and then president Koätunica appointed the prime minister who had to
accept the composition of the Government as a fait accompli. Soon after, the
Government adopted the consensual principle in decision-making. Hence, the appeal
of the consociational model lies in the fact that solutions which have already given
results in reality are the best ones.
An objection to the consociational model suggests that, due to the complicated
consensual decision-making, this model is inefficient and might have harmful conse-
quences on the implementation of a governmentÕs policy. Consensual decision-mak-
ing is perhaps somewhat slower, but there is no reason to believe that relative slow-
ness in decision-making necessarily implies inefficiency in implementing the policy.
Some studies showed that there is no difference between consensual and majoritari-
an decision-making when it comes to economic growth, inflation, unemployment, etc.
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But it should be stressed that, on the consensual model, the federation will anyhow
not be in charge of this kind of affairs, for these will remain the prerogatives of the
federal units. The federal government is to deal with strategic decisions concerning
European economic, political and military integration (joining the EU or NATO, for
example) that do not require the speed necessary for decisions concerning economic
policy, but require the widest possible consensus in acceptance of these strategic deci-
sions. Only the consociational model can guarantee this.
Confederate Solutions
The Montenegrin Platform of December 28, 2000 and an alternative version of a
confederate Constitution drafted by Belgrade Center for Human Rights, as opposed to
the Proposal and the Koätunica Platform, offer a confederate reorganization of FRY.
In the Montenegrin Platform, the new relationship between Serbia and Montenegro
should be based on a definition of Serbia and Montenegro as two internationally rec-
ognized states "mutually independent in the questions of their state and national sov-
ereignty and in realization of their interests" with maximum decentralization.
Although basically confederate, the Montenegrin Platform, as well as the Proposal
and the Koätunica Platform, implies a functional union. It is said that for both Serbia
and Montenegro, "the only acceptable concept is the one based on a constitutional
position of states as original holders of sovereignty, that pass a part of their affairs to
the joint bodies, as those affairs could be equally, rationally and fully accomplished
at the union level." While the Montenegrin Government sees a new union as a func-
tional one, the solutions that can be found in the Platform cannot be said to corre-
spond to the idea of functionalism. 
In part IV titled "Prerogatives of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro," the
Montenegrin Platform suggests three areas that the Union be charged with Ñ defense
and security of the Union, foreign policy of the Union, and the provision of joint mar-
ket and convertible currency. The prerogatives are allegedly transferred to the Union,
but the Platform clearly postulates that the very same prerogatives originally spring
from the sovereignty of the republics. If Serbia and Montenegro are to have their own
military forces, formulate and pursue their foreign policy independently, and have
their own currency, the only reason for the Union to exist will be the coordination of
these activities. However, if the Union is reduced to the coordination of the activities,
the question is why maintain any form of political union in the form of a quasi-state
framework with the government, parliament and the president of the state? Joint bod-
ies for coordination of two independent policies established by an intentional agree-
ment would be a more appropriate solution for that matter.
The Belgrade Center for Human Rights confederate Proposal does not combine
federal and confederal elements in a particularly suitable way. Generally, in both a
federal and confederate system there exist a central body but with significantly dif-
ferent characters. In a confederation, delegates appointed by the governments of two
separate states who vote after obligatory instructions wield state authority. Their deci-
sions are made unanimously and are obliging only to their governments (states), but
not to the citizens of separate states. Only after confirmed by the authorities in each
separate state, are these decisions obliging for the citizens. Accordingly, the central
power in a confederation resembles more a diplomatic congress than to supreme
power. But the BG Center confederate Proposal suggests organs such as a parliament,
president and government, and these organs are constituted and make decisions in a
federal rather than confederate manner. The procedure of decision-making in the par-
liament is complicated, as it requires at least 51 representatives to vote for a decision,
but the decision could be made only if at least 11 representatives of each republic
vote for it. Although the procedure of decision-making is complicated, it is basically
federal, not confederal.
Furthermore, the parliament elected on "direct elections by a secret ballot" is seen
as formulating and pursuing its own policy. Sovereignty is assigned to the citizens of
Serbia and Montenegro, instead of being assigned to the republics founding the con-
federation. All this does not cohere with the idea of a confederation as defined above.
The BG Center proposal shows the main collision with the principle of confederation
by allowing for the interpretation that the confederal government pursues its own pol-
icy. All in all, this confederate Proposal is closer to a consociational model, as it sug-
gests parity in the number of ministers in the government. But a consociational model
is basically federal, not confederal.
In practice, confederations have long ago proven to be an outdated form of polit-
ical integration. All confederations from the 18th and 19th centuries turned in time
into federations (Switzerland, Germany, and the USA) or into simple state (the
Netherlands). Relations between states are nowadays arranged through various
forms of participation in international organizations that did not exist in the 18th and
19th centuries. Therefore, there is no need for Yugoslavia to become a confederate
state today.
Attraction and 
efficiency of
consociational models
Confederate
proposals are out of
date and not coherent
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Economic, legal and
sociological rational
for institutions 
A hidden threat
ruining society 
The Paths of Reform
From this volume of the Review forward, apart from presentation of economic
reforms, their monitoring and analysis, we are going to deal with institutional
and legal reform as well. We will monitor about twenty areas of society, state and
economy. At the beginning, we are presenting the methods and objectives for the
first several areas we are dealing with in the course of the project.
Legal and Institutional Framework
The experience of transition countries clearly points out that success in the
realization of legal and institutional reform has a crucial influence on the speed,
success and course of other reforms. Therefore, it might be said without exagger-
ation that legal and institutional reform is a turning point in the pro-reform orien-
tation of the government and the citizens of a particular country. FR Yugoslavia is
not an exception. The majority of the population agrees on the necessity and the
course of implementation of this reform, which is not the case with other areas
that require reforms.
There are numerous (economic, legal, sociological) reasons that justify system-
atic, universal and critical analysis of the problem. In the view of economic para-
meters, long-term positive effects of the implementation of legal and institutional
reform are certain, even though at first it seems that the transitional expenses of
its implementation exceed the expenses of maintaining the current situation. In a
legal sense, without implementation of legal and institutional reform, other
reforms (financial, monetary, etc.) that are carried out at present would be left
without institutions and legal mechanisms that guarantee their implementation,
which is a prerequisite for investments and other forms of economic cooperation
with the international community. In the view of sociology, legal-institutional
reform brings back the thrust in a real pro-reform orientation of the state since the
citizensÕ trust gradually decrease over the course of time; it consolidates thrust in
the persistent preservation in reforms.
Numerous objectives that the project attempts to achieve correspond to the
complexity of the issue of legal and institutional reform. It must be emphasized
that the establishment of a legal framework, i.e. the level and the territory where
the reform is to be carried out, is unbreakably connected to a clearly defined polit-
ical framework. In addition, it should be stressed that the maintenance of a status
quo in the judicial system is harmful. Some legal areas and institutions should be
reformed, revoked or established as new ones. The population should be
informed about the prospects, real expenses and speed of reforms. At the same
time, a criticism based on comparative jurisprudence, legal standards of the EU
and international community, and empiric research should all be directed at what
the creators and the executors of reform policy are doing. Finally, we must con-
duct an analysis of the current situation in legal institutions and areas where the
reform has been implemented and results achieved.
Corruption
Corruption is one of pressing issues in all countries in transition, including our
own. According to all polls and research of public opinion, corruption is noted as
one of the biggest and most important problems in transition countries. 
Corruption is a hidden threat ruining the whole of society. It is also a complex
phenomenon that raises many questions and must be observed from several dif-
ferent viewpoints (economic, political, legal, social, etc.). However, in the view of
weak economies of countries in transition, all quantitative researches showed neg-
ative economic effects of corruption. It unproductively spends the scarce
resources these countries dispose of, and thus threatens to slow, or even stop all
democratic changes.
Numerous objectives of the analysis correspond to the complexity of the phe-
nomenon itself. It is necessary to keep pointing to the danger and even to the
presence of corruption in our country, with clear and documented information
about the areas, public services, and individuals intertwined with this process.
Persistent education and informing the citizens is important as well, in order to
make a wide public front for the battle against corruption. Criticizing the actions
of the state in the area of legal regulation, as well as reform in public services and
state administration where the corruption is present is also required. Finally, con-
stant economic analysis of corruption should point at its high cost to society and
the state. 
A quick return to
international political
and financial
institutions
Monitoring is not an aim for itself. Pointing at the causes of corruption and the
problems in the battle against it should result in measures and methods of an anti-
corruption battle and to maximize the reduction of lost time.
Reintegration
One of the promises of the new authorities largely fulfilled this year refers to
the fast return to international political and financial organizations. Yugoslavia has
officially applied to join World Trade Organization (WTO) and the process of
admission to the OECD has started. Most significantly, Yugoslavia and the EU have
started negotiations on an "Agreement on Stabilization and Association".  The
membership in EU is marked as a priority and strategic interest of FR Yugoslavia.
The reintegration of Yugoslavia in international political, financial and eco-
nomic institutions is very important for several reasons. Keeping in mind our ten-
year experience of isolation and alienation from the international community,
there is no need for emphasizing how much it is important to participate in a mod-
ern integration process. Political and economic effects of membership are mutu-
ally connected. As for the size and condition of our economy, economic effects
are significant indeed. Membership in international organizations provides numer-
ous direct benefits (financial support, expertise, and access to international mar-
kets), as well as indirect benefits. Membership in these organizations guarantees
foreign investors that a country respects internationally established rules. 
Monitoring and encouraging the process of reintegration into the international
community is of crucial importance for Yugoslavia. This research is led by stress-
ing the meaning and significance of this process for our economy, population and
living standard, through analysis of different views based on experiences and
achieved results of other countries in transition.
Privatization
Privatization is vitally important for Yugoslavia; especially regarding the finan-
cial impact expected after the adoption of a new Law on Privatization and subse-
quent acts in Serbia (June — July 2001) and in Montenegro (2000). Monitoring and
analysis of the process of privatization is focused on transparency and legal pro-
tection of direct foreign investments and investors in general. The privatization of
about the 40 biggest socially-owned enterprises as well as of 4,000 smaller com-
panies will result in an increase in efficiency of restructured enterprises. On the
other hand, privatization is followed by numerous social issues of redundant labor
and the need for a reduction of corruption.
Therefore, the analysis and recommendations on privatization, in the view of
legal and institutional reform, are aimed at providing the Government and com-
petent Ministers, as well as leading participants in privatization, with an insight
into reactions of experts, public support and/or public criticism. A significant fac-
tor for research in this area is comparative experience of other countries in tran-
sition that have already carried out or have been carrying out privatization more
or less successfully. The support of citizens is by all means necessary for success
of the process, as well.
The task of analysis and recommendations is directed at pointing out possible
problems and obstacles during the implementation of privatization and possible
solutions for overcoming them.
Infrastructure
Although it might be looked at from different aspects, in the view of legal and
institutional reform of infrastructure, we are going to monitor changes in the elec-
tric-energy and traffic network. We are interested in the development of regula-
tions in these areas, and in integration with international institutions. With regard
to their nature, most changes are expected in the regulation of standards.
Traffic means the transportation of people and goods, i.e. the organization of
transportation, but also the "transportation" of news, which include telecommuni-
cations. The electric-energy system and its provision of constant supply are con-
ditio sine qua non of every modern economy. This became obvious after the cri-
sis in 1970s and thatÕs why these two areas are considered together.
In order to join the EU, Yugoslavia has to first initiate regional integration.
Therefore, Yugoslav membership in the Pact for Stability of Southeastern Europe
is very significant. Within the Pact, most actions have been carried out in infra-
structure projects so far (road network, railroads, telecommunications, river trans-
portation). Since September 27, Yugoslavia has been a member of CEMT, the
Conference of European Ministers of Transportation.
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Yugoslavia should
first pass through
regional
integration
The transit position of our country and the actual situation (physical separation
from Greece, an EU member; the shortest land route connecting Europe and Asia,
including the Near and Far East; the longest shipping road through the Danube
regardless of the fact that shipping is discontinued at present; projects on gas line
and oil pipeline) are attractive enough for foreign investors, especially regarding
the plan that two Transeuropean corridors are to pass across our country.
Attention should be paid to the plans on development of an EU traffic and elec-
tric-energy network by 2010. (September 2001, White Book). In the view of these
facts, the relatively high costs of infrastructure reforms could be resolved.
Legislation on the Economy
The new authorities have set the reintegration of Yugoslavia in financial and
other international institutions as a basic objective. The priority is admission to the
EU, while the first step is admission to the Council of Europe projected for next
spring. A transition period would be less painful if coordination of domestic legal
enactments with EU regulations starts right away. In view of the fact that it is hard
to expect coordination of the whole acquis communitaire, it is necessary to begin
reforms in accordance with the instructions given in the White Book on prepara-
tion of joined countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into inner
market of the Union. Of 23 areas encompassed in the White Book, the majority
refers to economic and related legislation. Therefore, the main objective in this
part of the project is monitoring and analysis.
The European Union has recently adopted a Statute of European Society that
enables companies, which carry out their activities in several member countries of
the Union, to be constituted as European companies and to develop into a unique
economic subject on the territory of the Union as a whole. This means there will
be unique regulations, systems of administration and publication of financial infor-
mation in order to avoid the adaptation to dispositions of national legislation and
passing through long-lasting and expensive administrative formalities when estab-
lishing a network of branch offices.
The first step in Yugoslav reforms might be a transition from the concept of
enterprises to the concept of trading companies that would require amendments
to existing Law on Enterprises. It encompasses restructuring, financial consolida-
tion and status and organizational changes of particular public enterprises into
trading companies, as well as of socially-owned enterprises to one of the existing
forms of limited liability enterprise or join stock enterprise.
If the transition to the concept of trading companies is accepted, this wider area
will encompass monitoring of related regulations, especially these concerning:
bankruptcy and liquidation, anti-monopoly legislation and rules on competition,
foreign investments, public acquisition (not regulated by law at present and it is
necessary to create and adopt a law on federal level as soon as possible), and the
promotion of small and medium enterprises by adoption of both federal and
republic laws.
Monitoring and critical analysis of reforms in this area is in process, together
with proposals of solutions for making domestic legislation closer to European
standards, while taking care of the situation and specific characteristics of our
economy.  The aim is to contribute to the recovery of economic activities and
preparation for business on a universal European level.
Fiscal Reform
One of the few areas where reform has already started in the second trimester
of this year is fiscal reform on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The Yugoslav
Federal Parliament had not adopted the Law on changes and additions to Law on
the basis of tax system as of July 2001. The Republic Law is largely, but not com-
pletely, in compliance with the Federal Law on the basis of tax system, whereby
all controversial solutions are better solved in Republic Law, while those from
Federal Law are a little old-fashioned.
We must build absolutely informed taxpayers with clear and exact knowledge
of what they pay, why they pay and what they get in return for the money; and
which officials are in control of the reporting, calculation and payment of taxes.
Therefore, monitoring of the effects of implementation of fiscal reform, legisla-
tion and other subsidiary legal acts, analysis of the extent of acceptance of reforms
by economic subjects and the population, and estimation on applicability of par-
ticular solutions, as well as proposals for certain changes, are aimed at a faster and
complete integration into international economic and financial flows.
Transition from the
concept of
enterprises to the
concept of trading
companies
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What is the Price of Delaying Reforms?
The political disputes within the leading coalition, although the parties included consider them
insignificant, cause immeasurable damage in the view of the future.
In MAP, there is an evaluation of economic damage resulting from the previous "national" politics of
catastrophic economic policy, UN sanctions, and NATO bombarding.1 The estimated damages ranges
from 150 billion USD to a fantastic 700 billion USD, depending on the assessed period of time and
required growth rate for economic recovery. 
Since October 5th, it has become sensible to deal with the evaluation of economic damages done
so far, as well as long-term economic damages owing to the late implementation of the basic econom-
ic reforms and confused approach to the reforms full of political frictions. On the graphic that shows the
difference between potential economic development since 1989 if we hadnÕt experienced the prior mis-
fortunate period, and so far actual and projected economic movements, there should be added a new
"curve" showing economic damages caused by the new authorities in Serbia.
The responsibility of the former regime is a final variable and itÕs time to start estimating the dam-
age caused by the acts of the new authorities (the acts that are more political than economic). The for-
mer regime can not be guilty and responsible endlessly when objectively considering current problems.
In the year 2001, GNP growth is estimated to range between 5 — 6%, but mainly due to the successful
agricultural year (more precisely, the catastrophic agricultural situation in the year 2000 set a favourable
basis for this yearÕs growth). Therefore, weÕll start dealing with the estimation of potential loss of GNP
with the year 2001 as a basis. The basic assumptions for the estimation are the follow:
¥ The achieved GNP in 2001 is 12.5 billion USD2; the potential GNP, according to the assumptions
presented in Mr StamenkoviÕs estimation is 42.9 billion USD, meaning the price of the former
regime is 30.3 billion USD in this year.
¥ The potential GNP growth rate is 5%, while the "reform" growth rate is 12%. The potential and real
GNP are equalized at the level of 108 billion USD in 2020.
¥ The reformed, or better said "heroic" growth rate (the recovery, since the growth will start after
achieving its 1989 peak) might be met, in spite of IMF and World Bank projections (5%) only if (1)
reform of the banking system continues at its current pace; (2) there is a concept of a social pro-
gram and legislation on employment and labour that will keep social discontent reduced to the
irrelevant level; (3) the dynamic start of the process of privatisation; (4) agreement with Paris and
London Clubs of creditors under the most favourable (Napoli) conditions; (5) corruption and eco-
nomic criminality is stopped in order to motivate the development of healthy private entrepre-
neurship (based on good ideas, working enthusiasm and abilities, etc).
There are three different scenarios brought into the calculation:  the Aid-dependent, the Romanian,
and the Populist-radical.
¥ The aid-dependent scenario would mean full acceptance of advice on the implementation of eco-
nomic policy given by international financial and creditor institutions. In that case, the estimated
growth rate of GNP would be 5%.
¥ The Romanian scenario would mean "stagnant growth" of GNP owing to the stop — go approach
to reforms following a lack of political strength and social consensus for the energetic implemen-
tation of necessary reforms. There would be some growth whatsoever, in spite of its modest rate
because the external conditions for the development of economic relations with the international
community are achieved; it would bring numerous positive effects (reallocation of resources
according to comparative advantages). The estimated growth is 3%.
¥ The Populist-radical scenario is brought into the calculation as an alarming warning. It means the
continuing of the hypocritical policy of protection of the widest layers of the population from the
evil international community, while the political elite and privileged oligarchy gain the profit. The
growth rate is estimated at 0%.
With regard to these newly introduced premises, the results would be as following:
1 Stojan Stamenkovi, "About Price of Events in Previous Decade", MAP, 11/1/1999, pp. 25 — 29.
2 We havenÕt adapted GNP projected on the basis of the rate of exchange of dinar at the market for this year. That will be much
lower. According to the purchasing power of the domestic exchange (PPP), GNP is significantly higher. Continuous apprecia-
tion of dinar in subsequent years will equalize GNP to the rate of exchange of dinar at the market with GNP projected in the
aforementioned work.
Potential GNP and Alternative Scenarios of GNP Growth
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¥ The "economic cost" of the former regime remain the same as in Mr StamenkovicÕs calculation —
707 billion USD, of which 193 billion realized in the period 1989 — 2000, and 514 billion USD
remained as a reason to keep accusing the former regime. The value of "the economic cost" in
three other scenarios is built up on these expenses.
¥ The "reform" growth rate doesnÕt cause additional costs, but only the realization of aforementioned
514 billion inherited from the former regime. In the year 2016 FR Yugoslavia would achieve the
relative position in the world economy that we had in1989.
¥ The aid-dependent scenario, with the estimated growth rate of 5% means a new loss of GNP to the
amount of 488 billion USD. Considering the average long-term growth rate of the world economy,
we would not achieve the 1989 relative position in the world economy by the year 2066.
¥ The Romanian scenario would create an economic cost of 567 billion USD, meaning the damage
of 78 billion USD more than in the aid-dependent scenario. Considering that the estimated growth
rate is equal to the long-term growth rate of the world economy, the catch-up process would never
start.
¥ The Populist-radical scenario brings a cost of 653 billion USD, a hardly imaginable amount that
shows the most citizens of Serbia are not yet aware how much the former regime cost us. In addi-
tion to the economic cost of the former regime, it would come up to the amount of 1360 billion
USD.
The basic conclusions that might be drawn out of these estimations are the following:
¥ The "reform" growth rate appears as fantastic, but with regard to the worn-out production
resources, it is unfeasible. But the growth rate should not be based on "the rich national resources",
"the agriculture as a comparative advantage", etc. but on the fast establishment of prerequisites for
the development of entrepreneurship, and as efficient as possible an allocation of resources in ref-
erence with the comparative advantages of Serbia (or the FRY, since Montenegro is at the level of
the statistic error in each calculation of the economic aggregates except for tourism). For the suc-
cess of this version of economic recovery, itÕs necessary to have a consensus among the state, cap-
ital, and labour on the equitable distribution of expenses of the reform in order to enable all inter-
est groups to enjoy the subsequent economic prosperity.
¥ The other three "development" scenarios, regardless of the different growth rates, make new eco-
nomic costs that are, on a long-term basis, equal to the costs of the former regime. (The Populist
in 2019, the Romanian in 2020. and the aid-dependent in 2021.).
¥ The only alternative to the determined implementation of the reforms is to maintain hopelessness,
meaning biological disaster of the population (we have already experienced spiritual, ethical and
economic disaster, but the economy is, as opposed to two other categories, more dynamic cate-
gory), since the new young generations will seek a chance for normal life out of this country.
Catch-up Process - Achieving the 1989 Relative Position in the World Economy
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Towns and Factories*
With the restructuring of the factory "Zastava" in Kragujevac, the Serbian
Government has started a very important part of the process of structural adapta-
tion. It represents a finally begun process of solving the problems inherited from
the socialist self-management enterprises-giants. These enterprises were often
founded because the powerful politicians of the time wanted to build factories in
their hometowns to be remembered by future generations. It was unimportant if
and in what period of time the production programme would prove as efficient.
This question was not taken into consideration at the time, since no one had
responsibility for the potential inefficiency of invested resources. The main objec-
tive was to employ a growing number of people moving to the towns from their
villages. The achieved loss was being booked and cumulated year after year and,
marked as a quasi-fiscal deficit, was covered with inflation.
The problem of redundant labour was noted as early as at the beginning of
1970s, and especially in the middle of decade, when full decentralization of the
management in society, economy and individual enterprises was carried out. The
so-called "OURization" of enterprises produced a large number of administrative
workers. Thus, for example, the available information show that Smederevo Forge
"Sartid", while employing 10,000 workers, had about 1,000 employees in the food
department, 3,500 in the construction department and a huge administration, so
that less than a half of employees worked in production. 
Within SFR Yugoslavia, Serbian political leadership agreed on carrying out the
development strategy dominated by the programmes of production of food, ener-
gy and raw material. This, in the view of gaining a certain degree of profitability
rather an "unfavourable" economic structure had a significant impact on the effi-
ciency of the Serbian and Yugoslav economy. Under conditions of a non-market-
oriented system, the unsuitable development policy applied on the small and rel-
atively undeveloped areas like Serbia, where inefficiency of the economy made
our goods uncompetitive on the world market, lead the country to an economic
crisis of large dimensions, which finally turned into a deep crisis of the political
system.
In certain towns, the so-called political factories emerged: "Zastava" in
Kragujevac, "RTB" in Bor, "Sartid" in Smederevo, and factories for electronic and
mechanical industry in Niä. Except for Niä, these towns were worldwide recog-
nized for their factories.
Transition and Towns Recognised for Their Factories
Kragujevac, Bor, Smederevo and Niä in the period of self-management socialism
stood as different poles of development. According to the number of employees per
1000 inhabitants in 1989, these towns were far above the average in Serbia (with-
out Kosovo and Metohija), with the exception of Smederevo that approached the
average. Over 50% of all employees were employed in industry and mining. In 1989,
when former Yugoslavia had started a transition, the national income per inhabitant
was over 10% higher than Serbian average: in Niä it was 12.5% above the average,
but in Smederevo it was 2.9% below the average. The share of industry and mining
in total national income exceeded 70% in Bor, in Smederevo (with participation of
the agricultural area of 83% in total) it was near 60%, as well as in Niä (60%).
Table 1: Towns; Characteristics of Development
Town Year Agricultural Population Population Employed Empl. in Empl. in Unempl. NI* per Social Industry
Machines June 30 Increase/ per Economy Industry, per 1,000 inhab. Ownership & Mining
(%) 1000 inh. 1000 inh. (%) Mining, % inhab. (Ser. w-out Share Share
(31.12.) K. & M.) in NI*, % in NI*, %
Serbia w-out 1989 66.2 7,947,000 0.8 299 82.0 41.0 55 100.0 86.9 47.8
K & M 1999 65.9 7,781,000 -3.8 252 76.5 40.7 89 100.0 25.4 30.5
Kragujevac 1989 65.6 177,000 4.6 400 86.3 53.8 58 71.3 89.1 37.9
1999 65.6 181,700 -1.7 336 79.0 46.9 92 50.1 43.2 24.1
Bor 1989 48.5 58,800 3.4 406 85.0 54.5 52 202.5 96.7 72.4
1999 48.5 59,700 -2.9 350 83.0 55.9 82 87.0 78.5 62.3
Smederevo 1989 82.9 114,900 4.5 292 85.8 49.8 53 97.1 87.5 58.3
1999 82.1 117,300 -1.0 242 79.5 52.0 95 50.1 31.6 -7.6
Niä 1989 62.9 244,200 4.2 403 82.7 45.2 101 112.5 94.5 59.5
1999 62.3 251,100 -2.1 322 76.8 39.1 162 102.8 38.9 26.8
* NI - National Income
Source: Republic of Serbia municipal data; Republic Bureau of Statistics
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The production level in these factories, as leading factors of the development
there, in September was down 74-94% compared to the 1989 average.
Since 1989, the physical volume of production in the aforementioned branch-
es has trended downward. Since 1993 extremely low levels of production were
maintained in machinery, transport vehicles, and electric machines and appli-
ances.
The data show there had been a reduction of total number of employees in
industry and mining in the period 1989 -1999. However, the reduction is much less
compared to the decrease of real production volume, pointing to the fact these
towns will face a great problem of redundant labour that should be solved through
the restructuring enterprises-giants on their territories. 
This is a very delicate problem that must be solved as painlessly as possible. But
the problem is inevitable, and according to our analysis the sooner we start solving
it the lesser the social costs. The restructuring of factories should provide a signifi-
cant increase in factor productivity, where new knowledge and skills should come
to their full expression. This is the only path to increase the competitive position of
their products on the domestic and world markets. It is also a condition for the reduc-
tion of state budget pressure and for a successful implementation of the process of
privatisation of factories or their newly founded separate parts. The engagement of
high quality management teams in the enterprises and their particular parts is
required, as well. The new Law on employment will have a simulative impact on effi-
ciency and will speed up the process of restructuring Serbian enterprise — giants.
Serbia Without Kosovo and Metohija
Black Metallurgy Colored metal ore Machinery Transport vehicles El. machines
and appl.
Index Average 1989 = 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
September 2001 20.4 25.2 5.8 6.1 12.9
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Table 3.Towns - Employed
Town Year Total Employed in Industry Share in Total
Employed Industry & Mining No. of Employed, % 
Kragujevac 1989 70,764 37,364 52.8
1999 61,036 23,840 39.1
1999/1989 86 64
Bor 1989 23,894 12,956 54.2
1999 20,920 11,186 53.5
1999/1989 88 86
Smederevo 1989 33,556 16,479 49.1
1999 28,443 12,758 44.9
1999/1988 85 77
Niä 1989 98,347 43,936 44.7
1999 80,937 29,222 36.1
1999/1989 82 67
Source: Republic of Serbia municipal data; Republic Bureau of Statistics
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An Estimation of Required Workers and Redundant Labour
The restructuring of the mentioned factories is not only important in order to
attract domestic and foreign investors who are to provide the currently non-exis-
tent floating capital, but also for the sake of improvement of the efficiency of the
whole Serbian economy. The restructuring of Zastava in Kragujevac serves as an
interesting case for projecting forward estimation of the required number of
employees for (1) the current labour productivity level, and (2) the projected level
of labour productivity after restructuring is realized.
Although the data from the previous table should be considered conditional
due to the lack of relevant information for more precise assessments, it might be
concluded that the mentioned factories have relatively high redundant labour.
Therefore, the main objective of the analysis is to point to the possible problems
that the management and employees in these enterprises, mayors and Serbian
Government are to face very soon. It is early for more precise assessment of the
effects of the social programme applied in "Zastava" with regard to its applicabil-
ity in the other similar factories. But, the most significant specific characteristics of
some of the analysed towns relative to Kragujevac (see Table 1) lead to the con-
clusion that the social programme applied in "Zastava" could not be applied in the
same way in the other factories.
Characteristics of the Social Program for Zastava 
In 2000, "Zastava" Group had 29,882 employees in 47 companies, with 25,086
employees out of this number working in Kragujevac - 40% of the labour market
in Kragujevac.
Employees who found themselves on the list of redundant labour could choose
from the following options:
1. To join the enterprise "Zastava Employment and Education". These employ-
ees are to be treated as if there is a temporary lack of need for their work. They
are promised a new post in the next four years, but if this term expires without a
position offered the enterprise is not allowed to discharge them. They are pro-
vided 45% of the salary they would earn if they had stayed at their former posts.
2. To quit their jobs and to apply at the Republican Bureau for the Labour
Market. Under the law, they have legal right to pecuniary compensation of 60% of
their last salary for a duration that depends on the number of years of service (for
details, see Economic Review, 0109). The sum can not be less then 40% or more
than 80% of the average salary of the employed in economy.
3. To accept a separation compensation in the amount of 200 DM in domestic
exchange for each year of service.
Table 4.Towns - Factories for Restructuring
Factory Kragujevac Bor Smederevo Niä
Employed
Zastava 25,086
RTB 13,018
Sartid 8,850
Electronical Industry & 15.000
Machinery Industry
Estiamted Number of Employees Needed
Zastava 11,495
RTB 3,400*
6,500**
Sartid 3,300*
4,000**
Electronical Industry & 3,000*
Machinery Industry 7,000**
Estiamted Manpower Surplus
Zastava 13,591
RTB 9,618*
6,518**
Sartid 5,550*
4,850**
Electronical Industry & 12,000*
Machinery Industry 8,000**
* According to the production level
** In case of increase of production
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All funds necessary for realization of the program are provided from the bud-
get of the Republic of Serbia and the Transition Fund.
All the enterprises that are not engaged in the final production or in the sale
of vehicles were divided from "Zastava Group". Twenty dependent production
enterprises and 9 dependent service-providing enterprises were broken off the
parent firm. The division into smaller units and into independent enterprises gen-
erates more responsibility and greater motivation for profit making both in the
management and among employees.
In agreement with "Zastava Group", the Serbian Government promised to pro-
vide a sum of 5 million DEM in the form of favourable credits for the develop-
ment of small business in the Kragujevac region through the Agency for
Development of Small and Medium Enterprises founded on August 1. All employ-
ees of "Zastava Group" identified as redundant labours have equal rights to be
granted a credit.  The state also promised basic investments in fixed assets and
working capital in order to maintain a minimum level of productivity until a new
private partner appears.
Conclusion 
The magnitude of redundant labour in industrial factories is evident, as is the
fact that the towns where the factories are situated can not deal with this issue by
themselves. The assistance of the republic Government and Republic Bureau for
the Labour Market is necessary. While a short-term burden to simultaneously sup-
port both higher social payments in the face of rising unemployment as well as
more proactive credit schemes and retraining, neither approach can maximise its
returns in the absence of the other.
Until now, wages for redundant labour have been paid by the factories, either
through paid leave or by paying worker to stand idle at their station. In future,
funds for the temporary unemployed wonÕt be provided by the factories, but from
the Budget and other special Funds, including the Republic Bureau for the Labour
Market.  This change, though logical from an economic perspective, may produce
social tensions that can be politically exploited by those who resist reform.
Therefore, it is very important for the employees to be informed on their future
financial position within the factories that are planned to undergo the process of
restructuring, and of the options and benefits that await them should they be let
go. The local authorities and local media, together with experts, should have a
leading role in keeping employees informed.
It also is essential to tailor labour market relief and renewal to local conditions.
"Zastava" had a relatively high ratio of redundant labour compared to the other
mentioned enterprises-giants. Moreover, compared to Smederevo and Bor, Niä is
a town with a diversified economic structure that requires a social programme
compatible with local conditions. RTB BorÕs economic and social situation is quite
different compared to Smederevo. Though "Sartid" employs more than half of the
registered local labour market, the local wealth in fertile agricultural land points
to the possibility of a different type of social programme than in either Niä or Bor. 
It is reasonable to expect a faster increase of unemployment in the towns with
the highest concentration of labour in the factories-giants, but this is by no means
due to bad policy of the new Government. The process of restructuring initiated
in Serbia has not prompted the issue; it only helped to identify the problem of
redundant labour and finally to start solving it.
In addition to active and passive labour policies, a significant factor in the solu-
tion to the problem of unemployment will be the increased mobility of labour
expected after the adoption of legal regulations based on a market-oriented con-
cept of enterprises. The low mobilisation of domestic labour is, above all, due to
the current labour legislation that supports firm relations between the employees
and the factories they work in. Serbian workers are not used to changing their
work and living place, but it will become a usual practice in the course of time.
* This article is written with the assistance of Mirosinka Dinki
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Prices
In the course of September, retail prices in Serbia were up 1.4%, making total infla-
tion measured by retail prices for the first three quarters 32.9%. In July and August,
the prices of services grew faster than the prices of goods. Growth was mostly influ-
enced by two price corrections in telephone services and partly by price adjustment
to some transport services (taxi and public transport organized by private companies).
The prices of services in September was up 1.5%, exceeding the 0.8% growth in the
prices of goods. The increase in the prices of goods was mainly due to the 3.2% rise
in price of a group of industrial food products. In this group, there was a correction
in the price of fresh meat, meat products and cooking oil. Industrial producer prices
were up 1.5% in September. In the last three months, industrial producer prices have
showed constant growth.
Year-on-year inflation measured at the level of prices in September is 101.5%. Since
September 2000 was the last month prior to the liberalisation of prices, huge differences
in month-to-month inflation and other inflator indicators in view of the annual level are
gradually to decrease in upcoming months and to completely disappear at the begin-
ning of the next year. Examining inflation in the third quarter of this year, there is a
noticeable downward trend. The cumulative inflation rate for the first nine months of
this year, relative to the last year, shows a moderate decrease compared to the cumu-
lative rate for the previous two months. Unless there is a significant correction in the
rest of prices, such a dynamics is to be expected in the fourth quarter as well.
The dynamic of faster growth in cost of living than in retail prices continued in
September. The cost of living was up 1.8% on average. Cost of living index growth was
largely due to 3% growth in the price of basic nutrition. Growth in the prices of basic
nutrition was significantly influenced by the rise in the prices of fresh meat and meat
products, which have a high weight (0.1558) in the consumer basket, as well as by the
higher price of cooking oil.
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2001 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX I-IX
CPI 103.2 101.5 102.3 111.3 103.5 104.7 101.8 102.9 101.8 137.9
Food, beverages, tobacco 100.8 100.1 103.0 110.0 104.4 101.6 101.4 104.2 103.0 132.0
Living Nutrition 99.4 100.9 106.6 117.3 102.0 103.0 101.7 109.0 103.2 150.7
FoodstuffB 101.7 99.6 100.5 105.2 106.1 100.6 101.2 101.0 102.8 119.5
Housing 113.9 102.6 102.7 127.6 101.2 119.1 100.5 99.9 100.3 186.0
Electricity 100.1 100.0 100.0 159.3 100.0 139.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 222.6
Utilities 189.3 108.4 101.9 102.1 103.4 100.6 100.4 102.0 101.5 231.0
RentB 111.0 104.4 106.4 94.3 102.2 97.9 101.3 99.2 100.3 127.3
Transport and Telecommunication 103.5 104.5 100.0 109.4 100.3 102.5 118.5 118.6 100.8 172.4
CPIB 102.6 101.5 101.3 104.2 104.6 101.3 101.3 100.6 101.6 119.9
Monthly Indices of Price
Note: Cost Price IndexB (CPIB) represents a basic inflation indicator. It has been calculated on the basis of the CPI, from which
bred, meat and milk, electric power, public utilities, transport and postal services have been deducted. In addition, 33.4% 
Source: Republic Bureau of Statistics
Rate of Price Growth (January-September 2001)
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The costs of living grew 37.9% from the beginning of this year to the end of September.
Cumulative inflation measured by the cost of living year-on-year in September was
97.3% and is significantly down relative to the cumulative rate in the previous month
(114%). The cost of living in the previous quarter shows the same tendency as retail
prices.
In the first three quarters of this calendar year, the highest growth was noted in
prices of public utilities (131%) electric power (122.6%), transport and postal service
(72.4%), followed by prices of basic living necessities (50.7%). A donation of the
European Agency for Reconstruction financed the import of electric power, thus
enabling the electric energy sector to offer some concessions in the third increase in
prices this year, previously set for 40%. The final average 15% rise for the price of
electric power alleviates growing social tensions and enables the Republic
Government to sustain its strict wage policy in the public sector without violating
strict budget limitations.
Of the total 37.9% inflation measured in cost of living units, almost two-thirds are
due to the share of transferred inflation which includes the correction of the disparity
in prices of bread, milk, meat, electric power, public utilities, transport and postal ser-
vices. Our basic inflation index show a 19.9% increase in the 66.6% remaining prices of
products and services that are included in consumer basket in the first nine months of
this year.
Wages
According to the data of the Republic Bureau of Statistics, the average nominal net
wage in September in Serbia (without food allowances and transport compensation)
was 6210 dinars or 203 DEM applying the accounting method effective until June 1, or
6900 dinars or 226 DEM according to the new methodology. The average gross wage
was 9940 dinars or 326 DEM according to the current foreign exchange rate. Although
the average wage in September expressed in DEM grew by 1.3% compared to the pre-
vious month, an analysis of data for three previous months points to a deceleration in
total wage growth in September.
The difference between the average net income expressed by the current and by the
previous methodology was 11.1% this month. In September, the average net wage
(according to the previous model of accounting) displayed a nominal increase of 1.9%,
while the real increase of the average net wage (corrected for the cost-of-living) was
only 1% compared to the previous month. The average wage calculated in September
this year shows a real increase of 22.2% year-on-year, while the average for the first
nine months of the year 2001 was up 9.1% in relation to the same period last year.
According to monitoring of the monetary flow by the Republic Bureau for
Accounting, income in FRY nominally dropped by 3.6% compared to August. Of a total
58.3 billion dinars, 10.1% less was paid in gross income to the employed compared with
the amount in dinars paid in the previous month. The total amount of mandatory pen-
sion contributions of 15.8 billion dinars remained essentially identical to August pay-
ments. At the same time, the total sum collected from the population was significantly
reduced - registering at 22.9 billion dinars, a nominal drop of 25.1%. The sums received
in terms of realized goods and services were nominally down 28.2%, while tax and con-
tributions collection were down 12.3%. The sum received in terms of realized goods
and services (18.1 billion dinars) and tax and contributions collections (3.7 billion
dinars) comprised more then 95% of the structure of total collected amounts. 
Income and Expenses of Citizens of FRY
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Labour Market
The registered unemployed, compared to the registered employed in FR Yugoslavia
in August 2001 was 29.9%, 3.9% growth year-on-year. The unemployment rate in
August 2001 in Serbia was 29.2%, and in Montenegro 39.2%.
In the year 2001 the decrease in total number of the employed slowed, compared
to prior years. In the period January — August 2001, the total number of employed
dropped only 0.36% year-on-year. The number of employed in the former socially
owned sector was down 2.58%, while in the private sector it was up 12.42%.
The number of registered unemployed in Serbia in September 2001 reached 775,356
persons, which is up 5.5% year-on-year. The growth rate of the number of unemployed
for the period January — September 2001 was 6.4% compared to the same period last
year.
Examining the structure of the unemployed according to educational level, the
largest number is of persons with incomplete or completed primary school (38.45%).
The highest unemployment is present among those with three-year or four-year sec-
ondary school education (54.53%). The remaining 7% include persons with advanced
and university-level specialistÕs training.
The gender structure of the unemployed was relatively steady in recent years.
Women make up about 56% in total number of the unemployed.
The number of vacancies registered at the Republic Bureau for Labour Market in the
period January — September 2001, is up 20.7% year-on-year. About 73% of the total
number of registered vacancies are filled monthly through permanent employment.
Industrial production
Industrial production in the FRY was up 5.5% month-on-month. In Montenegro, pro-
duction was up 2.4%, while in Serbia it rose 5.7%. In Central Serbia production was up
4.3%, while in Vojvodina it rose 8.2%
The de-seasonal index for September shows a drop in production of 1.1% month-
on-month.
Industrial production in the FRY in September 2001 was down 4.9% compared to
the same month the previous year when the same seasonal factors were effective. In
Montenegro, production was down 2.2%, while in Serbia it fell 5.1%. In Central Serbia
production dropped 11.7%, while in Vojvodina production was up 9.1%.
Industrial production in the FRY for the period January — September 2001 fell 3.5%
compared to the same period last year. In Montenegro production was down 0.6%,
while in Serbia it fell 3.7%. In Central Serbia production fell 7.9%, while in Vojvodina it
increased 6.0%.
In the area of energy production, production of petroleum and petroleum products
was up 57.4% month-on-month, while production of coal fell 11.3%. Compared to 1989,
the production of energy was significantly down in September 2001: production of
petroleum and petroleum products was down 26%, production in the electric industry
fell 26%, production of coal fell 18%, and the production of gas and oil was down 12%.
Since the beginning of this year, the import of materials for reproduction has signif-
icantly increased in Vojvodina compared to the same period last year, while in Central
Serbia it stagnated (in September it fell more than 20% compared to August). This
means the increasing tendency in Vojvodina of industrial production will continue,
while recovery in Central Serbia can not be expected soon.
Industrial Production in FRY (1989 average = 100)
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Foreign trade
Preliminary data on foreign trade indicate that commodity exports in September
were valued at 157 million USD, while commodity imports were valued at 293 million
US$. Export in September was up 10% year-on-year (measured in nominal US$), while
import was up 7%.  For the first nine months of this year, commodity exports are val-
ued at 1.2 billion US$, which is up 4% year-on-year, while commodity imports were up
19% and reached the value of 3 billion US$.
These trends have resulted in a downward revision to the previously targeted for-
eign trade growth rate in the FRY. According to the new official projection, the expect-
ed growth of the value of commodity exports is 3.4% year-on-year (as opposed to the
previously expected 7.3%), while exports are expected to increase 21%. Such projections
are not unrealistic and correspond to this yearÕs trend, 3.5% growth of exports and
21.1% growth of imports at the federal level, relative to the first nine months of the last
year.
The monthly trade balance deficit is significantly lower compared to the first five
months of this year, which is primarily related to a lower import volume, but also from
a slight increase in export. Thus, the foreign trade deficit in Serbia in September was
136 million US$, and from the beginning of the year it is valued at 1.8 billion US$.
Nevertheless, the expected current balance deficit is 1.5 billion US$, which is a little
less then the previously expected 1.8 billion US$. This deficit is due to an increase in
the net influx of services and net transfers, which are expected to continue rising to the
end of the year. Thus, the hard currency influx at the base of services was up 40% for
the first seven months of this year compared with the same period last year.
In the most significant sectors of industrial processing there was an increase in the
value of import of raw material and semi-finished products, indicating a possible
increase in production by the end of the year, and probably of export of finished prod-
ucts. The highest increase in September was achieved in the leather industry and pro-
duction of rubber and plastics.  These also stand as the most important export sectors.
On the other hand, the effects of the last yearÕs drought are visible in the trade bal-
ance for the whole year. There has been a significant decrease in the export of food.
The export of fodder and grain was hardest hit. The structure of agricultural and food
product export is largely unfavourable, dominated by unprocessed products or prod-
ucts in a low stage of processing. Thus, for example, live stock export is at almost the
same level as in the last year, while the export of meat and meat products were reduced
by half.
The structure of export according to sector is similar to the last year. Raw material
makes up two-thirds of export, but has a downward tendency. Consumer product
import is slightly up.  The export of equipment shows a significant increase of over 40%
year-on-year, but off of a low base. The value of import in this category of products is
75% less than the value of import. 
Since the beginning of this year the fluctuation of the exchange rate is limited. In
the first nine months, the extreme values of the median rate of exchange of the dinar
against the DEM ranged between —0,75% and +1,91% compared to the exchange rate
at the end of last year. The mild depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will contin-
ue, since its growth is still much lower than the increase in retail prices, so the real
exchange rate continues to appreciate in the course of 2001.
However, this does not have a negative impact on demand for dinars, which remains
at a very high level. The National Bank of Yugoslavia is a net buyer at the exchange
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market, enabling the foreign exchange reserves of the NBY to double compared to the
beginning of the year. The level of foreign exchange reserves in the second half of
October was 1,075 billion US dollars, which could cover 3.1 import months (if the aver-
age monthly import value since the beginning of the year is considered).
Monetary and fiscal policy
The Central Bank of Yugoslavia decreased the discount rate from 1.6% to 1.3% a
month. This decrease in the discount rate, as well as the one applied on August 25,
affect the decrease of interest rates on the money market. In the course of September,
the interest rate of treasury bills ranged between 1.85% and 2.95% a month. At the
Belgrade Exchange, the average interest rate on short-term securities was reduced from
4.96% in August to 4.32% in September. Total payment operations were up from 5.66
billion to 5.75 billion dinars, while the average term of these securities reached a record
of 66 days compared to 36 days in August and 32 days in July. This is a positive signal,
especially considering the low level of industrial activity. However, interest rates are still
at a very high level and dampen the reanimation of production. 
At the end of September M1 reached 52.623 billion dinars, an increase of 8.39% com-
pared with August. The cash money supply grew 9.45% and reached 17.64 billion
dinars, while deposit money increased 7.86% to 34.982 billion dinars. The primary issue
resulted from provision of short-term credit of 1,7 billions to finance the budget deficit,
and net purchase of foreign exchange by the Central Bank in the amount of 1.064 bil-
lion dinars. During the whole of 2001, the only source of primary issue was foreign
exchange transactions, while credit financing of the budget appeared in August and
September in a total amount of 3.2 billion dinars. Since foreign exchange reserves in
September increased faster than M1, money supply coverage rose from 128.6% to 131%
at the end of September.
Public revenue collection decreased (29.6 billion dinars) compared to August when
a total of 30.37 billion dinars was collected. The revenues of the budget and other users
was 18.408 billion dinars, which is 1.51 billion less then the budget revenue in August.
The Republic Budget revenue dropped from 11.38 billion dinars to 10.77 billion dinars.
Excise duty revenue comprised 25.56% of budget revenue, which was the highest par-
ticipation of excise duty revenue so far. At the same time, the revenue of social insur-
ance organizations reached 11.189 billion dinars, compared to 10.45 billion dinars col-
lected in August.
The latest IMF projections indicate the total budget deficit in 2001 should be about
4% of GNP (about 27.7 billion dinars), instead of previously projected 6.1% of GNP
(about 41.4 billion dinars). The deficit should be covered through: credits provided by
the banking system (projected at 0.8% of GNP, i.e. 5.55 billion dinars), foreign credits
(1.6% of GNP, i.e. about 11 billion dinars), foreign donations (1.2% of GNP, or 8.32 bil-
lion dinars) and revenue from the privatisation (0.4% of GNP, or 2.77 billion dinars).
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